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Between the 1870s and the Great War more than two million Jews left 
Eastern Europe for the United States, while smaller groups settled in 
Britain, France and at other destinations such as Palestine, South Africa and 
Argentina. Few Jewish, Polish and other migrants from Eastern Europe 
were permitted to stay in Imperial Germany before 1914. But hundreds of 
thousands – most likely the large majority of the migrants – crossed through 
Germany on their way from the Eastern border to the big port cities 
Hamburg and Bremen, and to a lesser extent to Rotterdam, Antwerp and Le 
Havre. Until the mid-1920s, when the restrictive American legislation 
reduced the migration from Eastern Europe to a trickle, Germany was the 
most important transit country for migrants from the ‘East’, and the United 
States was the preferred destination for most migrants. 
The following article seeks to explore a little studied aspect of this 
mass migration, which distinguishes the Jewish from the Polish and other 
transatlantic migrations: the role of Jewish philanthropic organisations in 
different countries, in particular in Germany but also in the United States, 
Great Britain, France, the Habsburg monarchy and the Russian Empire. 
Several Jewish organizations specifically supported migrants in need, 
negotiated with governments, officials and shipping companies, thus 
coordinating and to a limited degree even managing the migration. 
Important organizations were: The German chapters of the Alliance 
Israèlite Universelle (AIU) and of the Independent Order of the B’nai 
B’rith, after the turn of the century, the Hilfsverein der deutschen Juden 
(HV), the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society, the American Jewish Committee, 
and later the JOINT, the Berlin-based Emigdirect and other Jewish 
associations such as the Baron de Hirsch Fund and the Jewish Colonization 
Society. The motives of the organisations and their donors were far from 
uniform. Apart from genuine compassion, the self-interest of established 




‘German Jewries’, concepts of ‘civilizing’ Jews in the East, and different 
political agendas – not least Zionism – played a role.1 
The relationships between Jewish philanthropy and the Jewish mass 
migration transcended national frameworks. That is one reason why detailed 
research in this field has been forthcoming only recently.2 The focus so far, 
however, has been on Jewish ‘development policies’ towards distressed Jews 
in the Balkans, the Ottoman Empire and Palestine, as well as after the First 
World War in the Soviet Union – but not on the mass migration prior to 
World War One.3 Historians who have covered transnational Jewish 
philanthropic organisations tend to place them within their respective 
national framework.4  
The expansion of the international Jewish philanthropy network in 
the second half of the nineteenth century raises the question how the Jews 
involved reconciled their national and transnational affiliations. Studying 
Jewish philanthropy beyond the nation state also provides a unique 
perspective on coordinated efforts that drew in state agencies and policy 
makers in different countries, commercial interests and private 
philanthropic initiatives – at the very time, when the international system 
underwent significant transformations. More importantly, several 
philanthropic Jewish organisations can be considered as trailblazers for the 
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Established Jews in the West and Jewish mass migration from the 
East 
 
Why did Jews in the West generously support Jewish migrants from the 
East? And what was their agenda? In the second half of the nineteenth 
century most Western Jews were migrants from rural communities 
themselves, often in East Central Europe, who had only moved to growing 
cities in Western and Central Europe and in the United States shortly before 
and after the middle of the nineteenth century. Especially in the German 
states and in North America, these Jews displayed a high social mobility 
literally rising as a group from poverty to modest wealth in one generation 
and overcoming social marginality. This remarkable Verbürgerlichung or 
embourgeoisement has been traced to the specific concept of emancipation 
more imposed on than offered to Jews in the German states. The exchange 
of traditional Judaism for Bildung – the universal and inclusive 
Enlightenment ideal of constant self-education – and modern Judaism in 
one generation, also led to an increasing estrangement from Jews in Eastern 
Europe.5 Emancipated Jews regarded Jewishness increasingly as a religious 
identity perceiving Jews from the East as ‘Ostjuden’, as traditional, 
uneducated, ethnic and visible Jews – as the antithesis of modern and 
educated ‘German Jews’ in Central Europe, the United States, and to some 
extent even in Britain.6 In this period the term ‘German Jews’ did not refer 
primarily to geographic origin but more to a specific modern Jewish cultural 
identity that was closely connected to social mobility and universal 
principles. The term has also a related but distinctive layer, especially in the 
United States, which reflects the perspective of arriving Jewish immigrants 
from Eastern Europe. For them German Jews represented social status: 
overly assimilated and established Jews who were embarrassed by the 
encounter with the Jewish immigrant masses and tried to shape them in 
their mould.7 
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In numerical terms modernizing Jews in the West constituted small groups, 
in their home states but also in relation to the dispersed Jewish populations 
across Eastern Europe and in the Ottoman Empire (including the 
Maghreb), the two leading centres of the Jewish Diaspora. The ‘rediscovery’ 
in a different light of these ‘other’ Jews whose legal and social status was 
insecure, was part of the Western Jewish modernisation process in mid-
nineteenth century Europe. Modern Western Jews felt responsible for the 
fate of Jews in the East. They wanted to protect them against discrimination 
and persecution, not least by turning poor and traditional Eastern and 
Oriental Jews into modern and productive model citizens of their respective 
home states. The rise of a transnational Jewish public sphere around 1840 
played an important role in this rediscovery process. In Jewish weekly 
newspapers published across the West, Jewish leaders debated how they 
could best support and transform the distressed and (in their perspective) 
‘backward’ Jews in the East. This approach towards ‘other’ Jews had 
without a doubt a strong paternalistic bend.8 
Jewish emancipation and modernisation, the attainment of full 
citizenship of nation states, the rise of a Jewish public sphere, and the 
rediscovery of ‘other’ Jews provided the background for the establishment 
of transnational Jewish philanthropic organisations. These were founded in 
the second half of the nineteenth century by Jews in France (Alliance 
Israèlite Universelle, 1860), Britain (Anglo-Jewish Association, 1871), and 
Germany (Hilfsverein der deutschen Juden, 1901). These organisations 
supported not Jews at home, but in Eastern Europe and the Orient who 
overwhelmingly did not enjoy full civil rights and were economically 
deprived. The Israelitische Allianz in the Austro-Hungarian Empire (1873), 
and several American-Jewish organisations such as the Independent Order 
of the B’nai B’rith (1843) or the National Council of Jewish Women (1893) 
also supported ‘other’ Jews but within the borders of their respective states, 
i.e. bourgeois Jews in Vienna supported poor Jews in the Eastern parts of 
the Empire, established American Jews did that for recent immigrants from 
Europe.9 
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The organisations focused especially on two areas: 1) the education and 
‘Westernisation’ of Jews in the Ottoman Empire, primarily through a 
network of schools. Spreading of British or French ‘Civilisation’ or German 
‘Kultur’ was often partly aligned with colonial and political interests, 
depending on the organisation; 2) the building of considerable support 
networks for Jews who were leaving Eastern Europe. 
Up to 1890 the sources corroborate the still dominant view of 
philanthropy organized by established Jews on behalf of Jewish migrants 
from Eastern Europe: Western Jews pursued an ambivalent strategy 
characterised by self-interest and compassion. They regarded migrating 
‘Ostjuden’ as an acute embarrassment and threat to their own recently 
gained status.10 After the middle of the nineteenth century caring for Jewish 
strangers ceased to be a local matter. Jewish emancipation in Central and 
Western Europe was only one facet of the expanding sphere of the (nation-) 
state. With the emancipation local Jewish residents became citizens of 
nation-states. Non-resident Jewish strangers on the other hand who wanted 
to settle down were (at least in the German case) categorized as unwanted 
aliens facing expulsion and rough treatment – if they were not 
transmigrants. And indeed, in Imperial Germany and to a lesser extent also 
in other Western countries anti-Semitic agitators instrumentalized negative 
and distorted images of Eastern European Jews massively to attack 
established Jews themselves as ‘strangers’ (or worse).11 This was one reason 
why apart from genuine compassion Western Jews did their utmost to 
prevent Jewish migrants from accepting support from non-Jewish 
philanthropic associations, and they publicly accepted their responsibility 
for taking care of poor Jewish strangers. 
Jewish philanthropy towards Jews from Eastern Europe in the West 
was aimed at their visibility. Jews in Eastern Europe were discouraged from 
leaving in the first place. Had they already crossed the land or sea border 
and were asking for support, Jewish philanthropies sent them further West 
or back home as quickly as possible. Did these options not apply (especially 
in the United States), migrants were shaped according to the self-image of 
the established Jews. Male migrants were to become productive artisans and 
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farmers, and women efficient household managers or housemaids. 
Americanisation and productivisation targeted visibility and public 
perception. The conditions the established Jewish sponsors attached to 
support were frequently neither acceptable nor intelligible for the recipients. 
Yet distressed Jews often had little choice and – to use an extreme example 
from America – had to move to a farm colony in North Dakota. Most of 
these colonies lasted only for a short time and Jewish farming schemes did 
not correspond with the needs of labour markets. But for Jewish sponsors 
the sheer existence of a few sturdy Jewish immigrant farmers was a strong 
argument against anti-Semitic agitation that denied Jews as such any claim 
to ‘normality’.12 
Poor Jewish migrants from Eastern Europe were not an entirely new 
phenomenon in Central and Western Europe. Since the seventeenth century 
Western Jewish communities from Amsterdam to Hamburg and Frankfurt 
had cared for but also occasionally rejected poor Jewish strangers and 
refugees from the East. But their numbers remained limited. At the very 
moment when Jews in Western and Central Europe were emancipated, 
became full citizens of their respective states, and rose on the social ladder 
around the middle of the nineteenth century, the economic and social 
situation for Jewish populations in the Russian Empire, in Southeastern 
Europe, and in Austrian ruled Galicia worsened considerably. In 1868/69 
the first Jewish migration crisis ensued. Following widespread starvation 
and the outbreak of disease in the Kovno and Suwalki provinces hundreds 
of distressed Jews crossed the border to Germany seeking the support of 
Jewish communities in the Prussian cities Königsberg, Memel and Stettin. 
The wave of many distressed migrants overwhelmed these communities and 
they appealed for help through the Jewish press. Other Jewish communities 
in the German states quickly responded, collecting funds and organising 
local support committees. In the leading German-Jewish newspaper, the 
weekly Allgemeine Zeitung des Judenthums (AZ), different solutions were 
discussed. Some authors of letters to the editor called for an emancipation 
of Jews in the Russian Empire and for simultaneous economic development 
schemes. Others were more pessimistic and saw ‘America’ as the only way 
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out.13 Ludwig Phillipson, the AZ editor and a respected rabbi, coordinated 
the support. In October 1869 he convened a conference in Berlin and 
invited the leadership of the Paris based Alliance Israèlite Universelle (AIU). 
The AIU, founded only a few years earlier, was the first major Jewish aid 
organisation representing Jewish philanthropy and interests on a translocal 
level. In the 1868/69 migration crisis the AIU helped with the coordination 
linking the Jewish communities in Prussia with American Jewish 
representatives. Eventually a few hundred Jews were dispatched across the 
Atlantic. Most migrants however were judged to be not ‘worthy,’ i.e. not 
able to support themselves in America and probably returned to their home 
villages and towns. The situational coordination strategy involving different 
Jewish aid organisations across borders to support Jewish migrants in times 
of crisis was resurrected in 1881/1882. After a wave of pogroms in Ukraine 
and a rumour campaign that promised untold riches to migrants after arrival 
in America thousands of Jews were stranded in the Austro-Russian border 
town of Brody. Again the AIU coordinated the support, networking dozens 
of local, national and transnational Jewish aid committees and organisations. 
This time many more Jews were sent to America.14 
During the 1880s the out-migration of Jews but also Poles, 
Lithuanians, Ruthenians, Hungarians, ethnic Germans and others from 
Eastern Europe steadily increased. Large numbers of Jews left for the 
United States and to a much lesser extent for Western countries. In addition 
many Jews – this is often overlooked – were internal migrants, moving from 
the Russian Pale of Settlement to the Polish provinces, especially to growing 
cities such as Warsaw and Łodz, and from Austrian ruled Galicia to Vienna, 
Budapest and Prague. Very poor Jews usually could not afford to leave the 
wider vicinity of their home towns. Others did not make it across the 
border. The terms poverty and wealth of course betray a wide spectrum, 
depending on the social position of the viewer. Even a little could be a lot: 
specific knowledge, contacts and skills represented sufficient cultural capital 
for high social mobility. Most transatlantic migrants from Eastern Europe 
(Jewish and non-Jewish) had sparse but sufficient funds, relatively precise 
information, belonged to small networks, and did neither ask for nor 
require support by private aid organisations. Yet after 1890 against the 
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background of strongly rising migration across the Atlantic these 
transmigrants faced much more thorough checks than before and aid 




Mass migration and restrictions 
 
During the 1880s Germany, long a huge net-exporter of migrants, especially 
to the United States, became a country of immigration. While Germans and 
Poles from within Germany found work in the rapidly growing industrial 
centres on the Ruhr, in Upper Silesia and in Berlin, especially Poles from 
the Russian Empire were seeking seasonal employment as agricultural 
labourers. It was relatively easy to walk across the long green border from 
the Russian and the Austrian-Hungarian Empire into Germany, but only 
very few were able to obtain a legal right to permanent residence (and only 
in rare cases citizenship). The German state, especially Prussia, explicitly 
refused to accept immigrants. During the 1880s the Prussian government 
expelled more than 30.000 ‘Poles’ (probably half of them were Jewish). 
These mass expulsions reflect the strong influence of anti-immigrant forces 
with strong anti-Semitic and anti-Slavic undertones.15 The distinction 
between Germans and (unwanted) aliens – both relatively new categories – 
however was also connected with the emerging German welfare state. Non-
German aliens were seen as a threat to the welfare state.16 Germany devised 
a thorough work permit and rotation scheme for labour migrants from 
Poland. Thus it was hard for illegal migrants to find work or remain 
undetected.17 With such measures Germany ‘successfully’ contained large-
scale immigration before 1914. Transmigrants, however, were more 
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welcome – not only because they did not stay but also because the business 















Picture 1: Former Auswandererbahnhof (emigrant train station) Ruhleben. 
 
In 1890 the United States implemented stricter control measures which led 
to the creation of a federal immigration bureaucracy and reception (or 
screening) facilities in port cities. In the following years, ‘unwanted’ 
migrants, mostly poor and ill persons, were returned in increasing numbers. 
Consequently the large steamship companies, which had to cover the 
passage costs for such involuntary return migrants, refused to take ‘certain’ 
people on board. The Russian authorities often declined to readmit ‘their’ 
subjects. In November 1891 the German authorities opened a control 
station for transmigrants in Ruhleben, a small train station in a Western 
suburb of Berlin, only a few weeks before Ellis Island went into operation. 
This was hardly a coincidence. After 1891 German border officials turned 
back ‘suspicious’ migrants at the Eastern border, or before they reached the 
ports on the North Sea. The severe controls in Germany formed part of an 
American system of ‘remote control’, designed to keep unwanted migrants 
away from America’s shores.18 The United States were not alone in pursuing 
such policies. In the second half of the nineteenth century long distance 
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migration increased around the globe largely as a consequence of integrating 
markets and cheaper and more efficient modes of transportation.19 The 
arrival of large numbers of racially and culturally ‘strange’ migrants in the 
West led to calls for immigration restrictions. In Britain discussions leading 
to the 1905 Alien’s Act can be traced back to the early 1890s.20  
This increasingly dense control network deprived Eastern European 
(and also Southern European and Asian) migrants of agency. Sometimes 
they were able to literally circumvent this system, especially in the early days 
after 1890. But the closer they came to America, the fewer loopholes were 
available and usually unwanted migrants could not appeal a decision over 
their rejection at any point of the journey. In contrast to migrants from 
most European states, Poles, Jews, ethnic Germans and other migrants 
from the Russian Empire could expect little if any protection from their 
government in St. Petersburg. Most did not have a clearly defined citizen 
status and had to leave illegally without identity papers because it was 
impossible or too expensive to obtain passports. The same applied to Jews 
from Rumania. Jews and Poles who hailed from the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire were in a more advantageous position. The Vienna government did 
protest against maltreatment of its citizens in Germany. Consequently they 
were not subjected to arbitrary mass expulsions but not exempt from 
controls along the German border – if they crossed legally.21 Nevertheless, 
at the very moment most Eastern (and Southern) Europeans left their home 
village, they entered an extra-legal space where state authorities, corrupt 
officials, criminals in various guises, and the private steamship companies 
had enormous leverage over their fate. They could be returned without any 
explanation at any time, or worse. Only when the migrants reached France 
or Britain, or left Ellis Island and arrived in Manhattan or New Jersey, they 
had firm ground under their feet in a legal sense. 
The outbreak of cholera in Central Russia, Hamburg, and in New 
York in 1892 led to even more stringent controls. For a few weeks the 
United States interrupted the transatlantic migration almost completely, 
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stranding thousands of migrants.22 In the mid-1890s the Prussian authorities 
build a network of control stations along the Eastern border and at or near 
large railway hubs. These control stations were operated and fully financed 
by the two German steamship companies, the North German Lloyd and the 
HAPAG. The companies also covered the costs of the German border 
officials, usually local policemen. The hugely profitable business of 
migration formed the basis of this public-private partnership. The managers 
of the steamship lines had a genuine interest in channelling unsuspicious 
migrants as efficiently as possible from border to port. They guaranteed to 
cover all costs for migrants who were rejected by the Americans. In return 
the German authorities made it more difficult for migrants with tickets for 
non-German steamship companies to cross the border. If they could not 
prove sufficient funds for a potential return journey, transmigrants could 
not enter Germany. On the one hand this practice unfairly favoured the 
German steamship companies, with devastating consequences for migrants 
who were judged to have the ‘wrong’ ticket. On the other hand, not all 
foreign steamship companies did provide the German authorities with 
guarantees to cover for the cost of an eventual return journey.23 
Nevertheless, it remained often unclear why migrants were rejected on the 
Eastern border. There can be little doubt that Lloyd and HAPAG tried to 
increase their already dominant market share, and Jewish aid organisations 
could not ignore the often nebulous practices on the Eastern border. 
 
 
The Hilfsverein der Deutschen Juden and transmigration 
 
Jewish migrants from Eastern Europe differed in several respects from 
other migrants. They belonged to a non-territorial Diaspora, originating in 
regions and states far apart across Eastern and southeastern Europe. Jewish 
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remigration rates were relatively low (although not negligible).24 In several 
Eastern European states, especially in Rumania and in the Russian Empire, 
the legal and social status of Jews was precarious. Towards the end of the 
nineteenth century Jews faced violent persecution, especially in the Ukraine. 
Detailed studies by John Klier and others have revealed only scant evidence 
for a direct connection between the Jewish ‘Emigration Mania’ and the 
Ukrainian pogroms in the early 1880s; even between 1903 and 1905 when 
the violence increased the main causes driving the mass migration remained 
socio-economic. Yet at the time, Jews and the general public in the West did 
not question the connection between anti-Jewish violence and strong 
migration.25 More important was that Jews played no (or almost no) role in 
the plans of movements in Eastern Europe striving for national 
independence, except as the opposing ‘other.’ Several leading figures of 
national movements in Eastern Europe openly promoted anti-Semitic ideas. 
And although leading Western Jews had successfully tied Rumanian 
independence in 1878 to a promise of full emancipation of Rumanian Jews, 
the Bukarest government ignored such commitments, explicitly pursuing 
anti-Jewish policies. After 1878 the situation of Jews in Rumania worsened 
considerably.26 In other words, the situation for many Jews in the Empires 
was already difficult, but the spectre of independent nation states was even 
more worrying. Rising Jewish support for Socialism, autonomy and Zionism 
across Eastern Europe – and mass out-migration shortly before the turn of 
the century reflect this crisis.27 
Around the turn of the century, Jewish migration from Eastern 
Europe was reaching record levels, the long term outlook for Jews in 
Eastern Europe was bleak, and especially in Britain and the United States 
immigration restrictions were discussed. Up to this point the AIU had 
played the leading role in coordinating aid for Jews in the East. But 
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compared with Germany and the United States the Jewish populations of 
France and Britain were relatively small (albeit growing as a result of 
Eastern European immigration) and concentrated in Paris and London. 
Throughout the 1880s American Jews had warned Jews in Europe not to 
send Jewish migrants across the Atlantic. Local American Jewish 
communities did care for distressed immigrants, but in a few cases during 
the early 1880s they sent poor Jewish migrants back to Europe.28 By 1900, 
however, leading American Jews publicly accepted America’s key role as a 
safe haven for Eastern European Jews and their responsibility for the 
immigrants acknowledging that the post-1880-immigrants (who already 
outnumbered the Jews who had lived in the United States up to 1880) 
would determine the future of Jewish life in America.29 Since the majority of 
Jewish immigrants settled in New York and to a lesser extent in Chicago 
and Philadelphia, established American Jews promoted ambitious dispersion 
schemes, directing some immigrants to the Texas entrepôt Galveston.30 
Like their established American brethren and sisters, Jews in 
Germany had not yet organized a central philanthropic association on the 
national level. Compared with Jews in Britain, France and the United States 
their social status was more fragile; they had been emancipated much later, 
and were a visible minority. Jews in Germany were also more dispersed, had 
strong regional and local bonds, and belonged to several large local Jewish 
communities which made the establishment of a national organisation 
difficult. The power of strong local communities also explains why 
American Jews established national organisations relatively late and why the 
influence of New York based Jewish associations remained limited. 
Interestingly, Jews in Germany made up the bulk of the AIU membership 
but without being involved in decision making by the Paris leaders.31  
By 1900 a long term strategy ensuring the protection of Jews in the 
East had become a matter of urgency for established Western Jews. Instead 
of coordinating support in critical moments like 1868/1869 or 1881/1882, 
professional institutions were needed, which could act quickly to protect 
very large numbers of migrants. The expansion of the nation-state, its 
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presence on national borders and its definition authority over who 
constituted an unwanted alien complicated the situation for Jewish migrants 
from Eastern Europe and at the same time for Western Jews. Supporting 
‘other’ potentially threatening Jews and closely collaborating with Jews in 
other potentially ‘suspicious’ countries required a fine balance act to avoid 
doubts over compromising national loyalties. In this situation, German Jews 
had a special responsibility given their relative size and wealth, apart from 
Germany’s crucial role as the major transit country. 
The establishment of the Hilfsverein der Deutschen Juden (Aid 
Association of the German Jews – HV) in 1901 symbolizes a turning point. 
The HV and large American Jewish organisations moved into the central 
position that the AIU had occupied in earlier decades, reflecting the 
increasing weight and influence of these large and relatively wealthy Jewish 
communities. While American Jews obviously devoted much of their efforts 
to arriving Jewish migrants, several leaders like Jacob Schiff looked across 
the Atlantic already during the 1890s to assess how they could support Jews 
in Eastern Europe.32 
The HV leaders did indeed cautiously balance their national loyalties 
with their transnational activities, following in the footsteps of the AIU. 
Like the AIU the HV combined (German) colonial interests with its work 
on behalf of poor Jews in Bulgaria, the Ottoman Empire and the Levant.33 
However, more important and hardly researched is the role of the HV in 
the coordination of Jewish transmigration. The HV leaders did not have 
much time to plan a comprehensive strategy. In April 1903, one of the most 
notorious anti-Jewish pogroms occurred in Kischinow which made 
headlines around the world. Anti-Jewish violence culminated again in late 
1905 when Russia was in the midst of political turmoil. In this year the 
British parliament passed the Aliens Act. Jewish immigration from Eastern 
Europe was a major factor behind the bill. When bringing the Aliens Act to 
the floor in 1904 Prime Minister Arthur James Balfour stressed that ‘the’ 
Jews ‘remained a people apart, and not merely held a religion differing from 
the vast majority of their fellow countrymen, but only intermarried among 
themselves.’ The Liberal opposition managed to mitigate the restrictions 
envisioned by the Conservative government, and eventually the act was not 
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strictly enforced before the First World War. Nevertheless, the Aliens Act 
made it possible to exclude (poor Jewish) immigrants.34 Thus it constituted 
an alarming precedent for the leaders of Jewish aid organisations. Between 
1904 and 1906 the Prussian government expelled thousands of Russian 
Jews from Berlin, returning them across the Russian border without paying 
any attention to the political chaos and the persecution of Jews in the 
Russian Empire.35 
Following Kischinow the HV convened a conference in Berlin in 
June 1903. The representatives of Jewish philanthropic associations from 
France, Britain, the United States and the Austro-Hungarian Empire 
resolved ‘not only not to support emigration (of Jews from the Russian 
Empire), but to repel it with all means.’36 All delegates knew that Jewish 
out-migration would hardly decrease following the pogrom and against the 
background of the difficult political and socio-economic circumstances in 
the Russian Empire. And of course they could not stem the tide but at best 
improve the conditions for the migrants. Nevertheless, the explicit 
statement of what the organisations did not do – repel the migrants – 
astonishes. The reason was quite simple. The American authorities were 
increasingly suspicious of groups of poor migrants who were ‘dumped’ on 
its shores rather than moving on their own account. Thus the Jewish aid 
organisations had to take a cautious approach in their public statements. It 
was perfectly legal to improve the conditions for migrants and act on their 
behalf, but providing direct material support to relatively poor migrants was 
an awkward matter.37 
The activities of the HV in one year illustrate a new approach. In 
1904 alone at least 100.000 Jews migrated to the United States, most via 
Germany. The HV annual report for 1903 carried extensive and illustrated 
reports of the Kischinow pogrom – hardly an indication of repelling Jewish 
migrants, nor of lacking empathy with Eastern European Jews but rather an 
indication for the existential threat for Jewish life in the Russian Empire.38 
The direct support of Jewish migrants, as it had been practiced in earlier 
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decades, was now of secondary interest. The number of migrants was far 
too high. Much more relevant was the provision of legal protection to Jewish 
migrants outlined above. 
In 1904 the HV deputy leader, author and philanthropist Paul 
Nathan, travelled to Russia. He visited a number of Jewish communities 
and met with representatives of Russian Jewish organisations, even with 
several government officials. Nathan then undertook a separate trip along 
the German-Russian border. Upon his return he ‘leaked’ some revealing 
observations to the general press. He singled out the powerful owner of the 
HAPAG steamship company, Albert Ballin, making him personally 
responsible for the arbitrary treatment of migrants in the border control 
stations. Ballin was one of the most successful businessmen in Imperial 
Germany; he had built the HAPAG into the world’s largest steamship 
company. But Ballin was also Jewish and had occasionally faced anti-Semitic 
abuse. Not surprisingly the attack by a Jewish philanthropic organisation on 
a Jewish businessman in the general public had an immediate effect. An 
AIU representative had already negotiated with the HAPAG regarding the 
border control stations – without reaching any concessions. But now Ballin 
caved in. He immediately arranged a meeting with Nathan and HV 
president James Simon. The HAPAG director gave accreditation to the HV 
aid committees on the Eastern border, allowing them access to the control 
stations; and he promised to end the arbitrary practice of rejecting migrants 
who had tickets by Dutch or British steamship companies. The HAPAG 
also began to provide Kosher meals to passengers on its transatlantic 
steamships.39 Suffice to say, non-Jewish migrants also profited from the 
more transparent handling procedures on the border. 
The press campaign illustrates a new more aggressive and clever 
strategy to improve the situation of the migrants. In 1904 the HV convened 
another large international conference in Frankfurt to draw up the 
principles of its protection work: 
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- reliable and continuous information of (potential) migrants before 
departure – through the Jewish press and specific pamphlets in Yiddish 
and Russian;  
- language courses before departure; 
- protection of migrants at sensitive points of the journey (border, train 
stations, ports) against authorities, transport companies and criminals – 
through the constant and visible presence of Jewish aid organisations; 
- negotiations with transport companies to reduce the cost of passage; 
- negotiations with governments of the ‘transit countries’ (especially 
Germany) to achieve ‘firm and tolerant norms’ regarding the treatment 
of migrants; 
- networking with Jewish aid organisations in the destination countries to 
guarantee a social net for migrants; 
- researching new potential destination countries; 
- and the establishment of a ‘kind of Jewish emigration office’, with 
branches in the countries of origin, transit and destination.40 
 
In 1904 the HV established the Central Bureau for Jewish Emigration under 
its wings which emerged as a prominent clearing house for issues connected 






In its first annual report the ‘Central Bureau’ outlined its role. Jews in the 
Russian Empire and Rumania were described as de facto stateless because 
they could not resort to any form of state ‘protection.’ Therefore, the 
transnational ‘Jewish collectivity’ represented by the Jewish aid associations 
had ‘to do what usually is the task of the state’.41 This remarkable 
assessment demonstrates the transformation of Western Jewish 
philanthropy on behalf of Jewish migrants from and Jewish residents in 
Eastern Europe. Direct material support, productivisation and the efficient 
handling of transmigration were still relevant. But soon after the turn of the 
century transnational Jewish associations, in particular the HV, regarded 
themselves as guardians of de facto stateless Jewish migrants, and indirectly 
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of the threatened Jewish populations of the East. A specifically Jewish 
‘problem’ was transforming into a question of guaranteeing human rights 
and protecting persecuted minorities. 
The representatives of Jewish aid organisations negotiated with and 
(if necessary) publicly criticized governments and transport companies, 
collected and published information in different languages, advised Jewish 
migrants, provided shelters and kitchens at train stations, offered financial 
assistance, and networked with local Jewish aid organisations. Especially 
after 1900, transnational Jewish aid organisations linked the specific 
interests of Jews in need with universal humanitarian principles. They put 
much emphasis on transparency and publicity. They had to raise funds from 
private donors and to publicly explain and justify their expenditures. In 
short, transnational Jewish aid organisations were important forerunners of 
contemporary transnational NGOs.  
The annual reports of the ‘Central Bureau’ before 1914 are not – as 
one could reasonably expect – filled with assessments on the situation of 
Jews in Eastern Europe, but rather pessimistic reports on the immigration 
debate in the United States. In 1910 the HV described the scenario of 
America closing its doors to Jewish immigrants as ‘such a terrible a 
catastrophe, that it will overshadow the persecutions and pogroms (in 
Russia).’42 The First World War and the post-1918 military conflicts 
throughout Eastern and Central Europe interrupted the East-West 
migration. Just when Jewish migration to the West was increasing again, the 
United States did close its doors to almost all citizens of Eastern European 
states in 1921 (access was restricted even more in 1924). The American 
restrictions were indeed a very decisive factor in bringing the Jewish mass 
migration from Eastern Europe to an end – as the HV had feared before 
1914. Other countries such as Argentina and even Britain also restricted 
immigration in or after 1918, albeit not as severely as the United States.43 
In this situation the HV but also several Eastern European and 
American Jewish organisations attempted to help tens of thousands of 
stranded and unwanted Jewish refugees and migrants. However, the loss of 
the ‘American option’ but more generally the crisis of the international 
system limited their possibilities. Post-war Berlin was of particular 
importance because of its location. It was a centre of activities to support 
                                                 
42 9. Geschäftsbericht (1910) des Hilfsvereins der deutschen Juden (Berlin 1911) 140. 
43 Michael R. Marrus, The Unwanted – European Refugees in the Twentieth Century (New 
York/Oxford 1985) 52-80. 




Jewish migrants. It was no coincidence that a number of pioneering proto-
scholars in the field of migration studies, most with an Eastern European 
Jewish background lived and worked in Berlin during the 1920s: Alexander 
and Eugen Kulischer, Joseph Schechtmann, Mark Wischnitzer, Jacob 
Lestschinsky, Arthur Ruppin, Joseph Roth, Leo Motzkin und Simon 
Dubnow. Wischnitzer, who wrote what is still the best overview of Jewish 
migrations in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and was himself a 
migrant form the Russian Empires, acted as one of the leading HV 
managers during the 1920s.44 
The nation-state paradigm but also accepted periodisations 
overshadow the history of Jewish transmigrants, who crossed or were 
stranded in between national borders – before 1914 but also and in 
particular after 1914. With the collapse of the large Eastern European 
Empires Jews became officially stateless in huge numbers. Obtaining the 
citizenship of one of the successor states of the Empires could be difficult 
or impossible. The restrictive American legislation did not reserve a quota 
for stateless persons. The post-1918 borders which literally divided Europe 
fenced out Jews as a trans-territorial people. Years before 1933, Jewish 
migrants and refugees in Europe increasingly faced borders which they 
could not cross. The story of stateless Jewish migrants – and attempts by 
Jewish aid organisations to support them – did not end in 1933 but rather 
with the Holocaust and its aftermath. After 1933 Jewish migrants from 
Eastern Europe without papers had hardly a chance of escaping Nazi 
persecution in Central and Western Europe. The migration of the few 
Jewish survivors after 1945 to Palestine/Israel, the United States, Australia 
and other countries constituted the sad epilogue of the Eastern European 
Jewish mass migration to the West. 
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